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Baruch: Present and Future National Objectives

..PRESENT AND FUTURI; NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
An · Address delivered by
Bernard M. Baruch
at the Naval · War College
March 31, 1950
Admiral Beary has asked me to talk to you on the subject

of strategy. I certainly ani not equipped

to

discuss strategy as it

relates to specific weapons or to the role of the different services
or even to the. military importance of the atomic bomb.

Since

World War One, however, I have studied the inter-relationships of
war and peace and some of my thoughts in this regard may

terest you.

in

A . little more than a year ago, one member of the Senate

Arm�d Services Committe� came to me in great agitation. He had

heard that a defense budget of $30 billions was being prepared
and he was frightened at what it would do to our economy.

He

asked my advice as to what policy should be followed in the matter

of defense expenditures fo� the cold war;

My reply was that we had to avoid panicky over-spending.

- Instead we had to learn

to pace ourselves in relation to the Russians

and the threat of war. We dared not over-spend on armaments to

where .our social, political and ·economic system might be wrecked

-that would suit the enemy as much as to defeat us militarily. Yet

we dared not maintain so feeble a defense establishment as to in
vite aggression, as it did in Hitler's time.

With each 8'ear· of added cold war attrition, this concept of

"pacing ourselves" · becomes more vital:--and also more difficult
to carry out.

The longer the cold_ war drags, the more essential it

Mr. Baruch, el<ler statesman, financier and philanthropist, was Chair
man of the War Industries Board in World War I. During World
War II, he servjld as adviser to President Roosevelt and War
Mobilization Director James H. Byrnes.
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becomes to husband our resources, yet the greater grows the

danger that the cold war may erupt into a hot, shooting war. In

the past few years, while the whole world has been digging itself
out from under the destruction and exhaustion of the last war, no

potential aggressor has had the material means for waging another

war.

But what will happen when the potential aggressor has re

covered his strength and there still is no peace?

Now by "pacing ourselves" I do not mean that we should

undertake to match Soviet armament, plane by plane, tank by tank,
man for man.

On that I am completely in accord with General

Omar Bradley. However, I do feel that we must vigilantly watch

the over-all degree of Soviet mobilization for war and that we

· dare not permit too great a variance with our own mobilization
or we risk war.

By "pacing ourselves" I also mean that we must preserve a

flexible attitude· towards our problems of defense and not freeze
rigidly on too narrow a strategy.

For example, I would not think

it wise to base our defense exclusively on our ability to retaliate

against the enemy's cities and industries.

To prevent aggression,

it is true that we must be able to retaliate instantly and that the

enemy should know we can do it.

Still, I am not sure that the

"next war" -May it never come-will begin with flagrant open at
tack upon this country.

It

seems to me quite likely that the test

may come in the more subtle form of civil war-probably. in Ger
many.

In event of such a civil war, the situation might be such

that it would be unwise to retaliate against the enemy directly and
yet we would not dare stand by impotent.

In short, I believe our defensive strategy must not only an

ticipate the danger of another all-out war, but that of civil war as

well.
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As a matter of fact, it might be said this state of civil war

already exists, that that is what the cold war really is, neither peace

nor total war, but a succession of civil conflicts, more or less violent,
wherever the Soviets can foment such strife.

In Western Europe

we have managed to achieve a sufficient degree of stability to pre
vent open civil war.

In Greece, after a bloody and costly struggle,

the civil war appears to have been decided in the favor of the dem
ocracies. In China we have suffered a truly serious defeat.

That defeat has stirred a good deal of public discussion of

whether we are losing the cold war.

Certainly there is sufficient

reason to feel that what has been done so far is inadequate.

A few weeks ago, the Secretary of State called for "total

diplomacy".

Undoubtedly that is what is needed.

that is not what we have.

Undoubtedly

Although the cold war is now dragging into its sixth year

and despite the enormous resources we have expended, we still

have not faced up

to

what the total peace-waging requires.

We

still stagger from crisis to crisis, with the initiative left to the

enemy.

We still treat each country as a separate problem, in

stead of as part of a unified global strategy.

For several years, now, I have been pressing, both publicly

and privately, for this over-all global strategy, which would do for

the peacemaking what our global strategy did during the recent
war.

To devise this global strategy I have urged that a central

"think body" be created, to survey the whole of the cold war, re

examining our policy and advising the President.

Recently my good friend Senator Vandenberg proposed a

somewhat similar group.

I arri afraid, though, that the re-evalua

tion of American policy he proposes would not go far enough

his letter talks only of political and economic policy.
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not believe that a special committee, which would study the prob

lems of ECA, report and then disband, is enough.

What is needed

is a non-partisan gr<Yu.p which will stay on the job until the cold

war is won, a group which would sit in continuous deliberation on
the whole of the peace-waging, serving as a central point of de

cision, weighing all the many commitments pressed upon us, guid

ing the best disposition of our strained resources, determining

where in the world we are to fight a more holding action and where

we can achieve a decisive break-through-and at what effort.
In short,. what is needed is a General Staff for Peace.

To cite only one instance of the sort of decisions now going

by default-take Indo China.

For tranquility to be restored to that

Asian outpost the civil war now raging there will have to be brought
to a victorious conclusion.

necessary military supplies?

Where are the French to obtain the

It has been suggested that the French

government use the materiel now being allocated to it under the

Military Aid Program.

But the aim of that Military Aid Program

was to strengthen Western Eur-9pe against possible Soviet ag
gression.

Are we then to weaken Western Europe for some half-

hearted and possibly ineffective action in the Orient?

Sooner or later we must expect a showdown over Germany

since Germany cannot be expected to remain divided indefinitely.

Are we pacing ourselves so that we will be ready for that show

down when it comes?

Or will it find us as unprepared as we now

seem to be to deal with conditions in the Far East?

Are we to continue to spread ourselves too thin, unable to

achieve decision anywhere? Hasn't the time come for the expen
diture of sufficient resources to force a decision somewhere?

If our diplomacy is to be truly "total", we must mobilize

not only public opinion but the necessary economic, military and
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political resources, applying those resources on the basis of an over
all global strategy. That is not now being done. I doubt that it
will be done unless some central peacemaking agency is created.

I began urging.the formation of such a GHQ for Peace even

before the last war ended.

In memoranda to President Roosevelt

I pointed out that America's greatest power in the peacemaking

would lie in the fact that we would emerge from the war with our·

enormou� productive power untouched by devastation. No country,
in the world would be, able to raise its living standards without
American help.

Our problem would be how to bring this great

productive power to bear upon the peacemaking as decisively as
we had done in the warmaking.

I proposed to President Roosevelt that an Advisory · Peace

Council be created consisting, of the secretaries of State, War,

Navy, Treasury, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
the Foreign Economic · Administrator and Harry Hopkins.

This

body was to consider all peace questions, formulating their recom

mendations for policy, which were to go to the President for his

final decision.

This Council was also to have a small staff of its

own under the direction of a Counsellor who enjoyed the complete
personal confidence of the President.

Roosevelt lik_ed the idea and said he would put it into effect.

He told me he would name James F. Byrnes as its chairman and

Judge Samuel Rosenman, as the Counsellor.

Judge Rosenman was

then in Europe and the President put off establishing the Council
until Rosenman should return.

Shortly after that, President

Roosevelt sent me to London to discuss some matters with Winston

Churchill and while there I told Judge Rosenman about the Presi

dent's plan.

A few days later we received the tragic news that the

President had died.
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When I returned from London, I repeated the suggestion for

this peace council to President Truman and he said he would create
the body. But the idea got shunted off.

"Possibly the reason was the creation of the National Secur

ity Council, which, I was told, was modelled upon the earlier sug

gestion of an Advisory Peace Council to the President. Unfortunate

ly if that is what the Security Council was intended to be, it hasn't

wor}ced out that way. The members of the Security Council are over

worked; its membership needs broadening; its functioning must be

reorganized

to

come to grips with the problems of achieving a de

cision in the peacemaking, instead of avoiding decision as has hap
pened too often in the past.

A revitalized Security Council could do the job but it would

have to be brought under the direction of a man of the stature of
General Marshall, and enlarged with men who have no other busi

ness but this. To win the cold war, there must be one group which
does nothing but think, work, plan-live and breathe-the cold war.

The first task of this revitalized Security Council might well

be to re-examine the whole situation to determine what would be

required to win the cold war and

to plan a step-by-step strategy for

taking the initiative in gaining peace.

Were that done, by the sort

of body I envision, I believe its recommendations would command
the support of the public and Congress.

Without such a central peacemaking agency "total diplo

macy" will remain a mere phrase.

If the American people are told what must be done, honestly

and frankly, they

will see the peace through. On the other hand,
if the tactics adopted are to lure them into ever deeper involvement,

bit by bit, without ever facing up to what the total peacemaking re
quires, then there will always be doubt of their willingness to drift
down a road which has no end.
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While this General Staff for Peace is our first need, it is not
our only need. For such a body to function effectively, it must
have the best possible intelligence. How are we to pace ourselves in
relation to the Russians unless we know what they are up to?
It is not easy to figure the Russians out. Still, I am not
prepared to accept the viewpoint of Russia as an unfathomable en
igma behind an impenetrable iron curtain. Certain factors about
the _Soviet Government should make it quite predictable.
As Dictators, the Soviet leaders can act without consulting
their people and are therefore capable of unloosing surprises. But
the Soviet Union is also a planned economy. Everything that hap
pens in Russia is supposed to measure up·to a Five Year Plan, which,
in turn, is broken down into yearly plans. The Plan doesn't always
work out in practice. Still it must reflect the judgments, decisions
-and motives--0f the Soviet leaders.
The Kremlin's calculations as to when war is likely-twenty,
ten, five, two years from now, or even sooner�must be embodied in
Soviet planning, in how critically short materials are divided be
tween immediate military needs and the expansion of Soviet in
dustry, in the rate of purchases abroad of materials the Soviets
lack at home and so on.
Russia. being a dictatorship, none of these things can hap
pen accidentally. Each action must reflect some decision taken in
the Kremlin. Each action reflects some caluculated risk which the
Soviet government is taking. By putting together all of the bits
and pieces, we should have an adequate basis for judging Russia'i:;
intentions as to war or peace.
Studying the Soviet economy in this w:ay should also give us
some means of checking the extravagant reports current as to Rus.,
sia's military strength. One day these reports picture the Soviet
RESTRICTED
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Union building a gigantic air force; then it is a terrific fleet of sub
marines; then it is tanks, and ground forces; then it is a navy. But
Russia can hardly be a great land power, a great naval power, a
great air power, a great atomic power, all at the same time. We
know how difficult and expensive it is for this country to maintain
our defense establishment and Russia has infinitely less resources at
her command than we do.
In the course of "pacing ourselves" we are always likely to
lag somewhat behind the Soviets in terms of readied military
· strength. In itself this is not necessarily alarming since our enor
mous potential for war also serves as a deterrent against aggression.
If overt Soviet aggression }}as been prevented these last few years,
it has not been solely because of our possession of the atomic bomb.
The Soviet leaders have also been mindful of the fact that at the
peak of the last war the United States produced nearly as many air
planes, tanks, guns and other war materiel as the rest of the world
combined.
We can be sure that the Soviet leaders have not forgotten
that fact. But we can also be sure that the Soviet leaders have not
forgotten that it todk us nearly two and a half years to convert our
gigantic productive energies from peace to war.
This time gap in our mobilization is our gravest source of
peril. It is the weakness around. which any enemy must base its ·
war plans. No nation in the world will attack a mobilized America.
The only strategy any enemy can have is to attempt to overwhelm
us during that "too little and too late" period while our military
power is still "on order."
That is the reason why I have never ceased urging the
prompt enactment of a stand-by mobilization plan, which would
insure the swiftest possible marshalling of. all our resources in case
8
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of attack. A ready.:.t.o-go mobilization plan should be put into law
now, to go into instant operation upon joint proclamation by Con
gress and the President. To wait until war has begun and bombs
are actually falling before we begin to legislate is to invite disaster.
Nor is anything to be gained by delay. What needs to be
done is as well known today as it ever will be. The question is
not what should be done, but whether we will do what we know must
be done, or wait until disaster is upon us.
Included in this stand-by mobilization law should be:
An impartial selective service law, with a work-or-fight
clause.
A readied civilian defense.
The elimination of profiteering.
The power to shut down less essential production to give
military needs priority.
Rationing of scarce essentials.
Much higher taxes.
A ceiling on all prices, rents, wages and other costs to pre
vent the inflation which could wreck any mobilization.
These laws would not specify the quantities of weapons to
be produced-that must be kept secret and be constantly revised.
Their objective would be to organize the nation so that if war came,
no time would be lost in meeting any military demands. May I also
emphasize that the whole program is needed, not merely parts of it.
.Under political temptation, some may seek to leave prices uncon
trolled, or . to soften other mobilization measures here and there.
That was done in the last war, at what a terrible cost not alone in
inflation but in lengthening the war and with it the slaughtering
and the maiming !
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To sum up there seem to me to be four major essentials

of. a successful cold war strategy:

1. A military establishment which includes not only an im
mediate available striking force of sufficient power to in

sure prompt retaliation and deter aggression, but one
flexible enough to deal with possible civil war abroad.

2. A ready-to-go mobilization plan which will insure the
swiftest mobilization of all our resources-men, money
and materials-in case we or our allies are attacked.

3. An effective intelligence agency to provide the informa
tion needed to pace ourselves in relation to the Soviets
and the threat of war.
4. A general staff for peace, to re-evaluate the whole of the
peacewaging and to formulate a global strategy which
will achieve a decision for peace.
One final thought, which I always like to leave with a group
such as yours. In the past, the American people tended to deny
the realities of power and to think that peace could be preserved
by mere moral pronouncements, by "outlawing" war and so on.
Today, there is general realization that peace is impossible unless

supported by military strength. Still, although aware of this fact,
many Americans are uneasy about it. They would like to forget
their dependence on military power, and so there is much grumbling
about the so-called "militarization of American life" and of the
"military running the country".

Don't let this grumbling disturb you. Yours is the right
to be proud of your profession. You have brought imperishable

glory to America. More important, you have never failed this
country in your role as the guardian and protector of our liberties.
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What makes" a police state is not the existence of the police

but the absence of law behind the police.

What makes a military

state is not the existence of the military but that the military con

stitute themselves the state. The American soldier-and by that

I mean you naval men as well as the members of the other serv

ice�has never attempted to be a law unto himself. I resent any

attempt to force you into a second-class citizenship. I, . for one,

want, to acknowledge the great debt we all owe you.

I will close with a quotation from "England's Answer'' by

Rudyard Kipling.

"Go to your work and be strong, halting not in your ways,

, Baulking the end half-won for an instant dole of praise.

Stand to your work and be wise--certain of sword and pet!,

Who are neither children nor Gods, but men in a world of men !"
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